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A b s t r a c t .  The paper contains an outline of combination ontology 
and semantics, developed in Perzanowski [1-11], w ith six subsequent 
applications to  combination metaphysics
1. Ontology is the general theory of the  possibility, i.e., the theory of 
the realm  of all possibilities -  the ontological space. M etaphysics, on the 
o ther hand, is the  ontology of the  world.
The world is the  realm  of existing items. After W ittgenstein ’s Tracta- 
tus: The world is all w hat is the  case. In other words, all events taken as 
existing complexes (facts).
2. If we distinguish (cf. [5]), inter alia, between the ontology of the 
being, including m etaphysics (i.e., ontology of the world) on the  one hand, 
and -  on the o ther hand -  the ontology of language and the ontology of 
mind, then  we see, by close connection the  later two w ith formal investiga­
tions of concepts, th a t set-theoretical and algebraic ontologies are closely 
connected w ith them , but not w ith the ontology of being.
True philosophy, however, is about the being. Therefore, we are still in 
need of a m etaphysics based on its background com bination ontology with
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appropriate  com bination semantics. In need, by definition, of combination 
m etaphysics.
3. In w hat follows, I will first try  to  outline such a semantics, based 
on com bination ontology, which is a part of a deeply m odal version of a 
general theory of analysis and synthesis. Next, I will try  to  apply it to  the 
analysis of the most fundam ental m etaphysical notions.
To this end, I will s ta r t w ith general rem arks concerning m odalities, 
w ith particular emphasis pu t on ontological and m etaphysical ones, passing 
next to  a ra ther general description of a theory of analysis and synthesis.
B asic  c la ssifica tion  o f  m o d a litie s
4. M odalities are modifiers. For example, alethic m odalities are mo­
difiers of tru th  components, or -  more generally -  semantical, logical and 
ontological components of a judgem ent and objects involved in it.
5. Let us consider two conjugate very general classifications of m odal­
ities:
A. Based on a gram m atical difference: Noun-like (like possibility, etc.) 
vs. adjective-like (possible or possibly, etc.)
B. Based on an ontological principle: Logical m odalities vs. superlog­
ical modalities.
5.1 Logical modalities are used for collection and comparison: possibly, 
necessarily, contingently, etc. They are adjective-like and, in their depth, 
they  are quantifiers, w hat is made clear in relational semantics.
5.2 Superlogical modalities are used for expression and m odification of 
very general conditions. They can be divided into several groups including:
A priori modalities, concerning w hat can be thought, used to  delineate 
the realm  of reason. Examples are thinkable, understandable, reasonable, 
controvertible.
Ontological modalities, kernel for our aim. They are useful for ex­
pression of the  general and basic conditions for some families of objects 
or, in particular, of complexes. They are, inter alia, used for delineation
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of the  ontological space of all possibilities, the  most general field we can 
deal with. Examples are: possibility, necessity, contingency, and exclusion 
taken in the sense of a condition; also compossibility, coexistence, and em­
inent existence in the  sense of Leibniz, (formal) possibility in the  sense of 
W ittgenstein ’s Tractatus; combinable, synthetizable and analyzable; and 
several common philosophical m odalities de re: by necessity, essentially, by 
its very nature, etc. And, last bu t not least, ontological makings: making 
possible, m aking impossible, etc.
M etaphysical m odalities, concerning facts and existence, w hat is real 
or actual: real, existing, actual, factual, true, false, to  be a fact, to  be true,
to  be an event, to  be a process; whereas m etaphysical makings are, among
others, the  following ones: m aking true, m aking fact, m aking real, making 
actual, m aking event, m aking process etc.
M akings
6. They form a basic and very challenging family of modalities. To 
outline them  let me s ta r t w ith a bit of English gram m ar. In English m a­
kings are of the  form G erund +  Noun: M aking N , for suitable N . The 
form is very general indeed. Consider, for example, two basic cases:
M aking Possible x makes y possible M P ( x , y )
M aking Impossible x makes y impossible M I (x ,y);
They are basic for there are ju st four positive-negative connections go­
ing from one item  to another: one positive (making possible), one negative 
(making impossible), one ontologically ambivalent (both  m aking possible 
and m aking impossible) and, finally, one ontologically neu tral or empty, 
when bo th  items under consideration are not connected at all, which is 
quite common assum ption in the case of com binatorial ontology. Cf. §22 
below.
7. Notice th a t the first argum ent x -  is usually named maker (or 
reason), whereas the  second argum ent y is a result of making. Consider
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also the original making introduced by Russell and investigated by his 
followers:
M aking True x  makes y true  M T (x ,y );
O ther na tu ra l examples are following ones:
M aking Real x makes y real M R (x ,y )
M aking A ctual x makes y actual M A c(x ,y)
M aking Fact x makes y to  be a fact M F (x , y)
M aking Act x makes y to  be an act M A (x, y).
8. To sum  up, English form of makings is very general and formal. It 
can be done for any noun, w ithout any clear lim itation. It is obvious th a t 
the most investigated case of m aking is the  case investigated in the  theory 
of action, where maker is considered to  be an agent m aking an action.
9. A bit of onto\logic of makings. Observe first
(1) M aking possible and m aking impossible are two basic makings.
It follows from purely apriori considerations sketched previously.
(2) M aking possible is, in a sense, ambiguous.
9.1. Indeed, we should distinguish a t least two extrem e variants: 
Strong variant: M P (x ,y )  means x makes y and y is possible, or x makes 
y to  be possible:
(M P  \  M ) M P (x ,y )  ^  M (x ,y ) A M (y).
W eak variant: M P (x , y) means P (x , y): x makes a necessary condition 
for y, or x excludes a barrier for y.
9.2. Hereafter M P  is the  common, general form of m aking possible, 
and other makings as well. We can consider it to  be a com bination of both 
variants m entioned above. As som ething from the  spectrum  between these 
two extrem ities: M P  =  M  +  P .
10. The strong variant M ( , ) offers a way to  define other makings. 
For example:
(M F  \  F ) M F (x ,y )  ^  M (x ,y ) A F (y ); x makes y to  be a fact, if it
makes y and y is a fact.
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(M T  \  T ) M T (x ,y )  ^  M (x ,y )  A T(y), explained in a similar way:
x makes y true, where y is a proposition, whereas x is its 
tru th - maker, whatever it means.
(M A  \  A) M A (x, y) ^  M (x , y) A A(y); x makes y an act, if it makes
y and y is an act.
11. Observe next th a t
(3) The weak version P (  , ) is weaker indeed:
(M P  \  P ) M P (x , y) ^  P (x , y), or more M P (x , y) ^  P (x , M (y))
(M F  \  P ) M F (x , y) ^  P (x , y), or more M F (x , y) ^  P (x , F (y ))
(M T  \  P ) M T (x ,y )  ̂  P ( x ,y ) ,o r m o re  M T (x ,y )  ^  P (x ,T (y ))  etc.
Making true
12. Up to  my knowledge, the only case of makings investigated till 
now in a ra ther extensive way is the  case of making true, M T . It is based 
upon two clues:
12.1. The Russellian one. Facts are left-side argum ents of M T . They 
are tru th  makers. This implies
(BR) M T (x , y) ^  F (x ).
Too much a tten tion  put on tru th  makers is chiefly responsible, I think, 
for placing in general makings in the  shadow of makers, covering thereby 
the m odal character of makings.
12.2. The Fregean and Tarskian one. M aking true  means verification 
(satisfaction):
(F  \  T ) M T ( x ,y ) : ^  x =  y,
w ith the usual compossibility principles. As a m atte r of fact, Tarski’s 
contribution to  the theory of tru th  can be understood as an axiom atization 
of m aking true  in the  case of the extensional classical language, based on 
set-theory as background ontology.
It is a logical custom  to differentiate between M T-argum ents: 
M T (N , A), or M T (X , A), where the first is a model or a set of formu­
las, whereas the  second is a formula.
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A conclusion
13. By the above analysis, in particular by (1), the general theory of 
makings m ust be based on (and, in fact, is a part of) com bination ontology, 
or general ontology of analysis and synthesis.
O n to logy
14. The most general theory of analysis and synthesis is one of two 
types. It is either com bination ontology or transform ation ontology:
G A S =  CO  +  TO.
15. In w hat follows I will, following Leibniz and W ittgenstein, deal 
w ith com bination ontology only, leaving investigation of transform ation 
ontology for another occasion.
T h ree ap p roach es tow ards  
a G en era l T h eo ry  o f  A n a lysis  and  S y n th esis
O rder Approach
16. It is natural, abstract and quite common. Let me define first 
ontological spaces of three kinds and their simples (if any), hence their 
substance as well.
16.1. Ontological spaces. Let O B  be the class of all items (objects). 
Assume th a t  the universe of a discourse U is included in O B . We distin­
guish a t least three natu ra l types of an ontological space of analysis and 
synthesis. Two uniform:
The space of analysis: (U, < ) where <  is the  relation to  be simpler than. 
The space of synthesis: (U, C) where C is the relation to  be a component 
of.
And their common extension:
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The space of analysis and synthesis: (U, < , C).
17. Notice the  large num ber of questions concerning connections be­
tween the two basic ontological relations: to  be simpler th an  and to  be a 
component of. Are they coextensive? Positive answer seems, however, to 
be a too far going oversimplification. Obviously, an analysis passing from 
” bigger” to  ’’smaller” is down-oriented, whereas a synthesis is up-oriented.
18. Simples and substance (cf. [10]). The most im portant offsprings 
of the  first, order, approach are variants of the  notion of simples and co­
simples (usually nam ed possible worlds). Both are limit notions. Simples 
are lim it-objects of the family of all proper ontological analyses; possible 
worlds (co-simples), on the other hand, are limits of suitable syntheses.
It is im portant to  recognize th a t a t least six notions of simples can 
and should be distinguished. Let me s ta te  here only four of them , where 
S  denotes hereafter either <  or C (read ’ simpler th an ” ):
Superelements: S E (x ) iff Vy x S  y
x is a superelem ent iff it is simpler th an  any object in the universe. 
Simples: S(x) iff - 3 y  y S  x
x is a simple iff there is no object in the  universe which is simpler than  
it.
Atoms: A(x) iff Vy (y S  x ^  x =  y)
x is an atom  iff the only one element simpler th an  it is x itself. 
Elements: E (x ) iff Vy (y S  x ^  x =  y V S E (x))
Elements are weakenings of atom s. The only objects simpler th an  them  
are they themselves or superelem ents.
19. Now, following the long and very distinguished line of thinkers, 
including Anaxim ander, Anaxagoras, Dem ocritus, Leibniz, K ant and W itt­
genstein substance is defined as the family of all simples of suitable types. 
Observe th a t  the substance can be not uniform, for it can be built up of 
various types of simples.
Notice also th a t in the  case of so-called unfounded ontologies substance 
can be empty. In such a case it is, for sure, not so na tu ra l and easy to
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introduce a suitable inductive s tructu re  in the  universe. Anyway, such 
alternative ontology m ust be trea ted  quite seriously.
Finally, let me stress th a t the  order approach offers an external de­
scription of synthesis. It does not, however, explain its mechanism.
O perator approach
20. It is based on investigation of two operators: analyzer a  and 
synthesizer a.
Analyzer a  produces for a given x the  family of all its pieces (parts):
a (x ) :=  {y : y is obtained from x by a};
whereas synthesizer a  collects for any x the  family of all objects th a t can 
be synthesized from x (or from its substance):
a(x ) :=  {y : y can be obtained by a com bination involving x, or its 
substance S(x)}.
O perator approach gives, like the order one, an external (or exten- 
sional) description of synthesis. It opens, however, a way to  its internal 
description. Cf. [11].
Internal, or modal, approach
21. To describe (at least necessary) conditions of a successful syn­
thesis it is convenient to  use two basic ontological m odalities introduced 
previously: m aking possible -  M P ( , ) and m aking impossible -  M I ( , ).
They can be introduced and supported  by means of the following three 
different considerations.
Consideration a priori
22. Clearly, for given two arb itrary  objects x and y they can be un­
derstood as argum ents for a basic ontological connection which, in tu rn , is 
either positive or negative. A priori there exist ju st four cases: the  case of 
positive connection -  M P , the  case of negative connection -  M I , the  case 
th a t connection is bo th  positive and negative, hence incoherent, denoted -
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M P I , and the most popular in com binatorial ontology the case of m utual 
neutrality  -  N ( , ). The first case is taken here to  be fundam ental.
Explication for a
23. Now we can offer the  following, ra ther na tu ra l explication for a 
powerful, nearly om nipotent, synthesizer: y is synthetizable from x iff it is 
be m ade possible from x:
a(x ) =  {y : M P (x ,y )}
Notice th a t the  above explication connects the second approach (oper­
ator one) w ith the  th ird  (internal) approach to  a general theory of analysis 
and synthesis.
W ittgenstein ’s insight
24. Let me quote one of the most mysterious theses of the Tractatus: 
(2.033) Form is the  possibility of structure.
Ask now w hat the possibility means? It has been pointed out by Frank 
Ramsey in his famous review of the  T ractatus th a t it cannot be read as a 
logical m odality (i. e., form cannot be trea ted  as an alternative structure), 
for this reading would im m ediately make T ractatus inconsistent.
My own proposal (cf. [1], [2]) is the  following one:
(4) Form of x is w hat makes the structu re  of y possible.
Formalization: M P (F o rm (x ) , S tr(y )), hence -  through suitable gen­
eralization -  M P (x , y).
25. Further W ittgenstein ian  and Leibnizian clues make the nature  
of M P  more clear: form of x is determ ined by its substance, whereas 
s truc tu ra lity  of y means th a t y is a complex built up in such and such way. 
Using syntactical categorization of Lesniewski and Ajdukiewicz we obtain 
therefore th a t M P  has the  category of quantifier: s /n , s -  which, as is 
easy to  see, is of higher order and deeply modal.
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Therefore M P  is a m odal quantifier, characterized after W ittgenstein ’s 
clue by
(5) M P (x ,y )  ^  M P (S (x ) ,y ) .
C o n cep tu a l fram ew ork  o f  C o m b in a tio n  O n to logy
26. It is extrem ely rich, enough to  define the basic notions of Leibnizian 
and W ittgenstein ian  ontologies. Hereafter I will cite only a few notions to 
illustrate the  above claim as well as for further use.
S tarting  definitions and axioms
M (x) : ^  M P (x ,x )  ontological coherence (to be ontologically
possible)
O F (x ) : ^  3 y M P (y ,x )  ontological foundation
G(x) : ^  V yM P (x ,y ) ontological generator (or God-like being
of a theory)
(SR) V xB yM P(y,x) ontic principle of sufficient reason
M onotonicity principles w ith respect to  S
M P (D , ) z S  x A M P (x ,y )  ^  M P (z ,y )
Down oriented w ith respect to  the  first argum ent.
M P (U , ) x S  z A M P (x ,y )  ^  M P (z ,y )
Up oriented w ith respect to  the first argum ent. Similarly for the second 
argum ent.
M P ( , D) M P (x ,y )  A z S  y ^  M P (x ,z )
M P ( ,U ) M P (x ,y )  A y S  z ^  M P (x ,z )




(O C ) —i (M P (x , y) A M I(x , y)) consistency law
(O E M ) M P (x ,y )  V M I(x ,y )  law of the excluded middle
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(O B I) — M P (x , y) ^  M I(x , y) law of ontological bivalence
Notice th a t  O B I  simplifies the dom ain of investigation under consid­
eration in a quite remarkable way: m aking possible and m aking impossible 
are interdefinable.
O nto\logical ones
They hold in the proper domain of logic, where a t least the second 
argum ent is a proposition (or formula), whereas the  negation is classical. 
(O L C ) —(M P (x , —A) A M P (x , A)) m eta-consistency law
No proposition is m ade possible, together w ith its negation, by the 
same item.
(O L E M ) M P (x , —A) V M P (x , A) m eta-excluded middle law
Each item  makes possible either A or —A.
(OLB) —M P (x , A) ^  M P (x , —A) m eta-bivalence law
Notice th a t  the above laws govern usual semantics. They are, in a 
sense, metalogical.
Compossibility and Com patibility
27. Let us finally consider compossibility - the most eminent ontologi­
cal modality, used by Leibniz as the main notion of his great metaphysics. 
F irst I will recall Leibniz’s original construction, which is metalogical in its 
depth, passing next to  its onto\logical counterpart in com bination ontology.
Leibniz’s metalogical construction
28. Recall first th a t Leibniz believed in discovering a suitable logical 
calculus of concepts enabling its user to  solve any rational question. As­
suming th a t it is done he was in power to  sketch the full ontological system 
- from monads and qualities to  the real world.
Thus let some logical calculus of concepts (names?, predicates?) be 
given. C n  is its connected consequence operator, whereas -  for any x -  
T h(x) is the C n-theory  generated by x.
Leibniz defined m odal concepts by the  following metalogical conditions:
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M (x) : ^  ±  € T h(x)
x is possible (its theory is consistent)
L(x) : ^  ±  € T h (—x)
x is necessary (its negation is impossible)
C (x, y) : ^ ± / C n ( T h ( x )  U Th(y))
x and y are compossible (their common theory is consistent).
Im m ediately we obtain  Leibnizian ”soundness” conditions:
(6) C (x ,y ) ^  C (y ,x ) Compossibility relation is symmetric.
(7) M (x) ^  C (x ,x )  Possibility means self-compossibility.
(8) C (x ,y ) ^  M (x) A M (y) Compossibility implies possibility.
W hen can the above implication be reversed?
O nto\logical construction
29. Observe th a t in the framework of com bination ontology we have 
already defined M (x) in a way respecting (7).
On the  other hand, the  previous question suggests th a t between 
M P ( , ) and C ( , ) there is another relation, more fundam ental than  
compossibility. It is so-called com patibility relation. Indeed, pu tting
C P (x ,y )  : ^  M P (x ,y )  A M P (y ,x )  - for compatibility, and
C (x, y) : ^  M (x) A M (y) A C P (x , y) - for compossibility
we obtain  a m anageable compossibility relation obeying the  above Leibniz’s 
”soundness” conditions.
Wholes are combinations of compossible collections, whereas possible 
worlds are obtained by m axim alization of wholes.
30. Finally, observe th a t in our approach we s ta r t w ith one basic on­
tological making: M P (x , y) -  m odality more fundam ental th an  Leibnizian 
compossibility, for it is definable in two steps from our basic making. O b­
serve also th a t the  above construction can be done for m aking impossible 
and to  both  basic ontological m odalities as well (producing quite Hegelian 
ou tpu t in this case!).
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C om b in ation  S em an tics o f  L ogical M o d a lit ie s1
Definitions
31. Now, an ontological frame U is the  trip le (U ,M P ,M T ); where U 
is any collection, whereas M P  and M T  are appropriate  binary relations 
on U , respectively making possible and making true. W ithout any loss of 
generality we can split U into the extralanguage dom ain U 'and  the language 
dom ain F O R  : U =  U ' U F O R , w ith suitable restrictions of M P  and M T  
to  these subdomains: M P , M T  Ç U ' x F O R .
We assume the well-known Fregean Tarski's conditions characterizing 
M T , w ith additional use of M P  :
- ) M T  (x ,-A ) iff not M T (x , A)
A) M T  (x, A A B  ) iff M T (x , A) and M T (x ,B )
v) M T  (x, A V B  ) iff M T (x , A) or M T (x ,B )
- ) M T  (x, A ^  B) iff M T (x , A) implies M T (x ,B )
♦ ) M T (x , ♦A ) iff M P  (x, A)
Observe
(□) M T (x , DA) iff not M P (x , —A).
M etafunctors ” no t” , ” and” , ”or” , ” implies” used in the  above definition 
are governed by the rules of classical logic, hence hereafter they  are replaced 
by appropriate  functors of classical logic.
For any ontological frame we put as usual:
U =  A iff Vx € U ' M T (x , A).
Notice th a t  the  above receipt works, m utatis m utandis, for any inten- 
sional logic!!
1 Cf. [8], [9]
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Correspondence
32. It is easy to  check the following correspondence list for m odal and 
onto\logical formulas:
Axiom of G odel-Feys-von W right 
(T) A ^  ♦ A
It is characterized by the im plication M T (x , A) ^  M P (x , A), i. e., 
by the inequality M T  <  M P : M aking tru th  implies (or is included in) 
m aking possible. In short: T ru th  implies possibility.
It is, in fact, the original A ristotelian explication of the  axiom, obvi­
ously more transparen t and clear th an  the alternative explication offered by 
relational semantics: xR x, i. e., the  a lternativ ity  relation between possible 
worlds is reflexive.
Axiom of noncontingency (for its nonsym m etric case)
(TV) A ^  DA
It is characterized by the reverse inclusion: M P  <  M T . Its ontological 
characterization is thus given by the implication: M P (x , A) ^  M T (x , A), 
reverse to  the  previous one. Thus noncontingency means th a t making 
possible implies making tru th , in short: possibility implies tru th .
Finally, the  conjunction of bo th  axioms, i. e., Triviality axiom
(TR) ♦ A  ^  A
corresponds to  the  equality: M P  =  M T , saying th a t m aking possible is 
simply m aking tru th . In short: possibility means tru th .
To conclude, the  above three closely connected axioms are explained 
in our semantics in a ra ther clear, na tu ra l and intuitive way.
33. Let us proceed now to three well-known axioms connected with 
ontological rationalism . Consider first the  axiom of ontological rational­
ism of Leibnizian type, saying th a t nothing is contingent (in a sym m etric 
version of contingency)
(R) ♦ A  ^  DA
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It is characterized by the im plication M P (x , — A) -  — M P  (x, A), 
which is equivalent to  the ontological consistency law (in its metalogical 
version, cf. § 26): —(M P (x , —A) A M P (x , A)).
It is indeed the soundest explication of Leibnizian axiom, for everybody 
knows (or a t least should know) th a t  ontological rationalism  is based on 
the law of noncontradiction. Recall th a t in the case of relational semantics 
the axiom is connected w ith the  condition of functionality for alternativ ity  
relation, which is also very rationalistic in spirit.
Its dual version is the  famous axiom of s tandard  deontic logic of 
A ristotle-von W right-M akinson:
(D) DA — ♦ A
It corresponds w ith the  implication —M P (x , A) — M P (x , — A), which 
is equivalent to  the  metalogical version of the ontological excluded middle 
law: M P (x , A) V M P (x , —A) - x makes possible A or its negation.
Joining bo th  axioms together we obtain  the  axiom of strong rationalism
(DR) DA ^  ♦ A
which corresponds to  the  principle of metalogical bivalence: —M P (x , A) ^  
M P (x , —A) : x makes possible either A or —A.
Recall th a t the  relational semantics shows another side of strong ra­
tionality: (D R) corresponds to  the  restriction of the alternative relations 
to  functions. As a m atter of fact, rationalistic description of the universe 
is often purely m athem atical, hence it is done chiefly in term s of functions.
34. Anyway, a t least in the above cases (but not only in them ) combi­
nation semantics dem onstrated  in a fairly clear way its power of intuitive 
philosophical characterization of an im portant family of m odal axioms.
Completeness
35. Now, it would be fine to  prove th a t the  above conditions fully 
characterize logics in question. The above semantics is indeed quite general 
and broad.
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36. Let P  be a m odal logic, C  -  the  classical consequence operator 
based on detachm ent and the classical logic CL.
L ( P ) denotes the family of all Lindenbaum  oversystems of P .
The canonical fram e  (L (P ) U F O R , M T, M P ) is defined now by p u t­
ting  the following definitions of bo th  makings:
M T  (X, A) iff A € X
M P (X , A) iff C (X , ♦A ) is consistent
Im m ediately from the definition we see th a t the making true  relation 
M T  is closely connected w ith the  characteristic function of the  Lindenbaum  
system  X .
37. By quite s tandard  argum ent (cf. [8]) we have
(9) TH E CO M PLETENESS TH EOREM  (Cf. Perzanowski [2], [8])).
For any m odal logic P , P  is characterized by the class of all ontological 
P-fram es.
38. M any corollaries follow immediately, including
(10) C L  is complete with respect to  all ontological frames.
(11) K T  is complete w ith respect to  all K T  - frames.
(12) D R  is complete w ith respect to  all D R  - frames.
C on clu sion
39. Makings form an uniform family of m eta-m odalities, w ith the 
classical m aking true  M T  as the paradigm atic case. It is, however, not the 
basic one, for the basic m aking is the  onto\logical m aking M P .
40. Notice th a t the  com bination ontological semantics works for all 
intensional logics. Indeed, com bination of makings produces adequate se­
mantics for intensional logics in general. The semantics is, in a sense, a 
com bination of m atrix  semantics - because of M T , and relational semantics 
- b y  M P  (and other makings, if necessary); w hat explains its power. In
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result, our semantics has the generality of m atrix  semantics, and the  power 
of explication characteristic for relational semantics!
41. To be not purely formal and artificial the  ontological combination 
semantics has to  be based on real ontology. Its explanatory power depends 
on the  previous onto\logical theory of suitable superlogical modalities, like 
the theory of M P  offers an explanation for logical m odalities ♦  and D.
42. In com bination semantics for a given family of m odalities difficulty 
w ith the place of sem antical analysis is where it really is - not on rather 
artificial problems connected with proving suitable completeness theorem , 
but in looking for an appropriate  ontological analysis of m odalities under 
consideration, for discovering their fundam ental m etatheory.
S ix  E asy  P ie ce s  o f  C om b in ation  M etap h ysics
Recall th a t m etaphysics is the ontology of the  world. It is therefore the 
ontology of facts, events, processes, the  ontology of causality, and similar 
topics.
Facts as Contingent Existing Objects
43. Let some basic algebra of objects w ith com plem entation — be 
given. By definition, all items with respect to  a given analysis are either 
complexes or simples:
(13) S(x) V C X (x)
Our basic conviction is th a t only complexes can exist. To exist, E (x), 
means here th a t x is w hat is a case, or event; hence w hat can be destroyed 
and thereby cease to  exist.
(14) E  (x) — C X  (x)
On the o ther hand, ” possible -  M ( )” can be understood either logi­
cally, or -  w hat we prefer -  ontologically, as coherence in the spirit of §28 
above. Now, to  be contingent means th a t bo th  x and —x are possible:
K (x ) : ^  M (x) A M (—x).
44. Facts are existing contingencies, whereas counterfacts are contin­
gencies which does not exist:
F (x )  : ^  K (x ) A E (x)
C F  (x) : ^  K  (x) A - E  (x).
Thus the realm  of contingencies is divided into the family of all facts 
(the world) and the family of all counterfacts (situations):
(15) F  (x) V C F  (x) ^  K  (x).
Clearly
(16) F  (x) ^  K  (x), M  (x), M  ( - x ) ,E ( x ) ,C X  (x)
C F  (x) ^  K  (x), M  (x), M  ( -x ) ,  - E  (x ) ,C X  (x).
45. Observe th a t for contingencies com patibility is equivalent to  com- 
possibility:
(17) K  (x), K  (y) ^  C  (x, y) ^  C P  (x, y ) ,C  ( -x , - y )  ^  C P  ( -x ,  -y ) ,
C (x, - y )  ^  C P (x , - y ) ,C ( - x ,y )  ^  C P ( - x ,y )
Facts Through M aking Fact
46. Facts are considered here as products of m aking them . According 
to  the  strong version of §10 we have the following soundness or correctness 
principle:
(S) M F (x ,y )  ^  F  (y).
Obviously, m aking fact implies m aking possible:
(18) M F  (x, y) ^  M P  (x, y).
47. As the m etaphysical counterpart of the  ontological principle of 
sufficient reason we have the  principle of m etaphysical foundation:
(M S R ) VyBxM F (x ,y).
If the m etaphysical foundation we define by:
M F D (y ) : ^  3 x M F (x ,y )
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then  the  principle of m etaphysical foundation says th a t any object is m eta­
physically founded.
Facts, after Russell, as tru th  makers
48. According to  this view, facts are left-hand argum ents of making 
true:
(BR) F (x) : ^  3 y M T (x ,y ).
In Russellian theory of thruth-m akers it can be taken for granted th a t 
m aking true  implies making possible:
(19) M T (x ,y )  ^  M P (x ,y ) , 
as well as soundness conditions
(20) M T (x ,y )  ^  F (x) A P rop(y);
Left-hand argum ent of M T  is a fact, whereas the right-hand argum ent 
is tru th -bearer, i. e., as stoic trad ition  says - some proposition.
49. Observe th a t two above approaches to  the notion of a fact are, in 
fact, complementary. Indeed, facts being, by the  soundness condition S , 
the right-hand argum ent of M F  are also, by Russellian insight B R , the 
left-hand argum ent in M T . Therefore we can take superposition of both 
relations
M F T (x , y) : ^  3 z (M F (x , z) A M T (z, y))
obtaining m aking relation which seems to  define facts implicitly.
Is above com plem entary characterization of facts, given in §§46-48, 
characteristic for them  or not?
On propositions
50. They are not facts, bu t (possible) situations, hence counterfacts. 
However, they  are closely connected w ith suitable facts: If a sentence x is 
true  or false, then  it is connected w ith a proposition
(21) T (x) V F ls (x )  ^  3 C F (y )P ro p (x ) =  y.
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51. Then x is true  means th a t x is a proposition and it is a picture of 
some fact. P icture is also a fact.
Let M P C ( , ) m ean m aking picture. Remember th a t  picturing holds 
only between facts:
(22) M P C (x , y) — F (x )  A F (y ).
T hat x is a picture of y means th a t there is a hom omorphism  between 
y and x. Using it we obtain
(23) T (x) ^  h (P ro p (x ))) =  y, for some F (y ).
Now, we can define a bivalent valuation in an obvious way:
(24) v(x) =  1 iff 3F (y ) h (P rop (x )) =  y, 
v(x) = 0  iff otherwise.
Processes - Events - Facts
52. A process, which is the basic item  of any ontology of processes and 
events, is a series of reconfigurations of some family of basic complexes and 
their products. Processes are done by M P R (  , ) -  m aking processes rela­
tion, i. e., some relation of m aking change. Processes have their duration, 
history and tim e (change m easure).
Now, an event is any phase, or happening, of a given process; whereas 
facts are m om ents2 of events - their existence (or being observable).
Thus, following suitable principle of foundation (sufficient reason), each 
process is m ade by something:
(25) P R (x ) — 3 y M P R (y ,x )
or if we use m aking acts instead of m aking process
(26) P R (x ) — 3yM A (y ,x ).
53. Events are obtained by suitable division of processes. This division 
is the kernel of m aking event, M E ( , ).
2 In Husserlian sense
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(27) P R (x ) A M E (x ,z )  — E (z)
On the  other hand, facts are common results of making process and 
making event:
(28) M P R (x ,z )  A M E (z ,y )  — M F (x ,y )
54. We have the following correspondence between procesual makings 
and m aking true:
(29) M T (x ,P R (y ))  ^  M P R (x ,y )
M T (x ,E (y ))  ^  M E (x ,y )
M T (x ,F (y ))  ^  M F (x ,y )
Suitable onto\logic of procesual ontologies, m ade after the receipt of 
com bination semantics [8], is now implicitly in hand, waiting for develop­
ment.
Causal Network of the  World
55. It is done by means of M F ( , ). The weakest (?) conditions on 
causality, as described in my Graal-M iiritz address [7], are as follows:
(JR) —3 x M F  (x ,x ) Irreflexivity
Nothing causes itself.
(T R A N S ) M F (x ,y )  A M F (y ,z )  — M F (x ,z )  Transitivity
If one causes the second and the second the th ird  then  the 
first causes the  th ird : Causality relation -  expressed by M F  
-  is transitive.
(N E ) 3 x ,y M F  (x ,y) Nonemptiness
Some items are causally connected.
56. Next, le t’s consider two closure principles saying th a t  the world is 
causally connected in bo th  directions. To be more exact:
The soundness principle of §46:
(S) M F (x , y) — F (y )
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and the  Proper Principle of Causal Closure of the  W orld or the  Principle 
of Determinism:
(D) V y(F(y) ^  3 x (F (x ) A M F (x ,y )) )
Facts are made by facts!
57. Consider also some additional principles:
(C ) M F (x ,y )  ^  F (x )  The closure principle reverse to  S 
(M R ) F (y ) ^  3 x M F (x ,y )  M etaphysical Rationalism  Principle 
Facts are not w ithout reason.
Let us consider, instead of the  world which is a ra ther complex whole, 
its universe FACTS -  the family of all facts.
58. Now let me repeat some observations of [7]:
(30) If S  and N E , then  F A C T S  =  0
(31) S, M R , C  iff F A C T S  =  0
(32) S, C  imply M F (x ,y )  ^  F (x )  A F (y )
(33) M S R  implies M R , D
59. Let me point out th a t the main theorem  of [7] was s ta ted  there 
in too weak form. Using the  same, well-known Schütte type argum ent, we 
can prove Leibniz’s theorem  on Nature:
(34) There are no true  atom s of the  (determ inistic) nature.
In more exact terms:
(35) Assume N E , S, IR , T  and D. Then 
Vy(F(y) ^  3 x (F (x ) A M F (x , y) A x =  y).
Hence, the  universe F A C T S  (the World) is fully unfounded. There 
are no simples between facts.
(36) F A C T S  is an infinite family which is fully unfounded.
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Som e surprising  con seq u en ces
60. The following consequences of the  combination m etaphysics of 
causality outlined above are for sure, surprising for rationalistic thinkers 
from the classical school of A ristotelian scholars.
Not for Leibnizian scholars, however!
60.1 Observe first, th a t there is no reason for all facts in the domain 
of facts. In short, no reason for the world inside it.
RATIO, if any, is outside the world. In such a case it preexists, hence 
it is outside the  world: Vy(F(y) ^  M P (x ,y ))  ^  —I F  (x)).
E ither there is no ratio  at all.
60.2. Notice next difficulties w ith two first ways of St. Thom as. Indeed, 
there is no first mover inside the  world. F irst Mover, if any, m ust be outside 
the world and move it, together w ith all its pieces (facts).
A ck n o w led g m en ts . The paper summarizes three my talks given 
a t the following Baltic logico-philosophical workshops: in G raal-M iiritz 
(1993), in Osieki Koszalińskie (1997) and in Copenhagen (1999). I like to 
th ank  Jan  Faye, Uwe Schefler and Max Urchs for invitations and their kind 
hospitality.
Support obtained from Polish Com m ittee for Scientific Research 
(KBN) by means of the grant 1 H01A 006 18 and indirectly by the  Flemish 
M inister responsible for Science and Technology (C ontract Bill 2002/41) is 
also thankfully acknowledged.
R eferen ces
[1] J. Perzanowski, Some Ontological and Semantical Puzzles of W ittgenstein’s Tracta-
tus , in: Aesthetics, Proceedings of the 8th In ternational W ittgenstein Symposium,
R. Haller (ed.), 15 - 21 August 1983, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky
Vlg., Wien, 1984, pp.224-230.
116 JE R Z Y  PER ZA N O W SK I
[2] J. Perzanowski, Logiki modalne a  filozofia, W yd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, pp. 
159, Krakow, 1989. Slightly modified version reprinted in [3], pp. 262 - 346.
[3] J. Perzanowski (ed.), Jak  filozofować?, pp. 400, PW N, Warszawa, 1989.
[4] J. Perzanowski, Towards Post-Tractatus Ontology, in: W ittgenstein - Towards a 
Re-evaluation. Proceedings of the 14th In ternational W ittgenstein Symposium, J. 
Brandl and R. Haller (eds), 13 - 20 August 1989, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Holder- 
Pichler-Tempsky Vlg., Wien, 1990, pp.185-189.
[5] J. Perzanowski, Ontologies and Ontologics, in: Logic Counts, E. Zarnecka-Biaiy 
(ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1990, pp.23-42.
[6] J. Perzanowski, Combination Semantics: A n  O utline, in: Signs of Humanity, M. 
Balat and J. Deledalle- Rhodes (eds.), Mouton de Gruyter, 1992, pp.437-442.
[7] J. Perzanowski, Reasons and Causes, in: J. Faye et al. Logic and Causal Reasoning, 
Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1994, pp.169-189.
[8] J. Perzanowski, Combination Sem antics fo r  Intensional Logics I. Makings and Their 
Use in  Making Combination Sem antics , Logique et Analyse, 165—166 (1999), 
pp.181-203.
[9] J. Perzanowski, Combination Semantics fo r  Intensional Logics II. Variants and 
Comparisons (In preparation)
[10] J. Perzanowski, Components of the Substance (In preparation)
[11] J. Perzanowski, A Profile o f Masonic Synthesis , Logic and Logical Philosophy, 
1 1 /1 2  (2003/2004) 167-189.
D epartm ent of Logic 
Jagiellonian University of Krakńw, 
j.perzanowski@iphils.uj.edu.pl
D epartm ent of Logic 
N. Copernicus University of Toruń
